OCSP responder
A pre-signed, replayable, multi-CA OCSP responder with keyless edge serving and post-quantum ML-DSA support. Built in Rust.
hoike (Hawaiian) — to show, to exhibit, to testify. An OCSP responder does exactly one thing: it testifies to the status of someone else's certificate.
Signer/edge split architecture. The machine that signs status and the machine that serves it are never the same machine.
Responses are batch-signed by the signer tier and sealed into ahu bundles. Edge nodes serve stored bytes verbatim — no keys, no signing, no HSM access on the hot path.
Edge nodes hold no signing keys. An edge compromise cannot produce a
false good — only denial of service or stale replay
within nextUpdate.
One responder instance serves many CAs. Routing uses the
issuerKeyHash multimap from each OCSP request's
CertID, handling re-keyed and cross-signed CAs correctly.
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 signing as first-class configurations, not patches. Batching amortizes post-quantum signature size across certificate buckets.
Self-describing containers with CBOR manifest, CMS SignedData
seal, and a sorted index for O(log n) binary search. Seal verified
on load against configured trust anchors.
OCSP responses signed via hardware security modules through
cryptoki — batch signing and live nonce signing
(nonce_policy = "live") with PKCS#11 keys; the private
key never leaves the module. Tested with Kryoptic; documented paths
for Thales Luna, Entrust nShield, Utimaco, and FutureX. Interactive
PIN prompt for production.
Bundles are sealed files that cross air gaps on removable media. Enclave mode uses byte-identical code paths — only acquisition differs. No gossip, no upstream, full functionality.
Epoch chain with persisted high-water marks prevents replay of older
generations. Fork detection catches duplicate signers immediately.
Stale-generation alerts before nextUpdate expires.
Serving nodes re-read the bundle directory on a poll loop
(HOIKE_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECS, default 15s) with
anti-rollback checks and atomic swap. A failed reload keeps the
previous generation serving.
Edge fleet coordination via the SWIM protocol (foca). Generation announcements, membership tracking, and urgent revocation notices. Gossip is never authoritative for status.
Ed25519-signed generation announcements with per-node identity
authorization (auth_mode required/permissive) and a
documented fleet rollout.
Monitors OCSP signing certificate expiry. Warns before deadline,
executes a configurable rotation_command for CA-specific
renewal. Delegated certs embedded per RFC 9919 §3.2.2.
Per-CA nonce handling: ignore for pre-signed,
forward to proxy upstream, live for
on-demand signing with the client's nonce on signer nodes.
Configuring live on an edge is a startup error.
Never-issued serials get freshly signed RFC 6960
unknown responses when the CA scope is
authoritative-complete and the request carries a
nonce. Keyless edges forward such requests to the signer.
One BasicOCSPResponse carries both SHA-1 and SHA-256
CertID entries per RFC 9919. One signature, one payload,
two index records. Log SHA-1 usage to track migration.
RFC 4533 Content Synchronization source for Dogtag certificate databases.
Persistent sync cookie across signer cycles, with a full-poll fallback
when the directory rejects the sync control. Provides positive issuance
data for authoritative-complete bundles.
One bundle carries both ECDSA and ML-DSA responses. Clients select via
RFC 6960 §4.4.7.1 PreferredSignatureAlgorithms. No flag
day needed for PQC migration.
Serving nodes load full bundles into memory and answer lookups by
binary search over the sorted index. For custom integrations, the
ahu library offers MmapBundle zero-copy mmap
access.
REST admin API with RBAC (Administrator / Operator / Viewer). React +
PatternFly 6 dashboard for bundle management, CA status, signing, and
OCSP query. Embeddable in the binary via --features embed-webui.
October 2026 promise-to-code audit closed all 12 findings:
fail-closed bundle admission, seal/OCSP key separation, exclusive
state writers. cargo audit reports zero
vulnerabilities.
Sign a bundle, inspect it, start the responder.
$ hoike sign --ca enterprise-ca --crl revoked.crl --demo-key -o bundle.ahu
INFO hoike::sign: reading CRL from 'revoked.crl' (42 entries)
INFO hoike::sign: signing with ecdsa-p256, epoch 1
INFO hoike::sign: wrote bundle.ahu (42 good, 3 revoked, 84 index entries)
$ ahu inspect bundle.ahu
format : ahu v1
producer : hoike 0.2.0
epoch : 1
scope : enterprise-ca (partial)
algorithm : ecdsa-p256
entries : 84 (42 good, 3 revoked, dual CertID)
size : 48.2 KB
$ hoike serve --config hoike.toml
INFO hoike: loading config from 'hoike.toml'
INFO hoike::core: loaded CA 'enterprise-ca' (45 entries, epoch 1)
INFO hoike::server: OCSP responder listening on 0.0.0.0:2560
$ hoike query --url http://localhost:2560 --serial 0A1B2C \
--issuer-name-b64 ... --issuer-key-b64 ...
INFO hoike::query: status=good, sig=ecdsa-p256, nextUpdate=2026-12-15RFCs and standards. 311 tests. 20 conformance assertions.
Full OCSP protocol with pre-signed response production, HTTP caching profile, nonce handling rules, and AIA discovery. Every protocol claim validated by wire-format conformance tests against OpenSSL and Go clients.
Container
# Pull pre-built image (x86_64 + arm64)
podman pull ghcr.io/czinda/hoike:0.2.0
podman run --rm \
-v ./hoike.toml:/etc/hoike/hoike.toml:ro \
-v ./bundles:/var/lib/hoike/bundles:ro \
-p 2560:2560 \
ghcr.io/czinda/hoike:0.2.0
Build from source
git clone https://github.com/czinda/hoike
cd hoike
cargo build --release
# Two binaries: hoike (~8 MB) and ahu (~1 MB)
cargo run --release -p hoike-cli -- \
serve --config hoike.toml
A Cargo workspace with six crates. The signer holds keys; the edge serves bytes.
Six crates with clean dependency boundaries.
Bundle format: read, write, verify, CMS seal, mmap zero-copy. Apache-2.0 OR MIT. No server dependencies.
CertID routing, request parsing, config, anti-rollback state store, seal verification on load.
CRL + syncrepl adapters, OCSP response & CMS seal creation, PKCS#11, ML-DSA bridge, live nonce signing, key rotation.
HTTP handlers via axum. Nonce policy dispatch, live signing, forward proxy. Admin API with RBAC auth. React webui (PatternFly 6).
SWIM membership and generation announcements via foca.
hoike + ahu binaries. The operator-facing surface.