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October 2026 Security Audit

Every finding from the October 2026 audit is closed with a named regression test. The remediation is implemented and locally evidenced; it is not deployed and not certified. This page tells the story for operators: what was audited, what was found, what changed, and what the closure does and does not establish.

What the audit was

On October 23, 2026, hoike underwent a promise-to-code audit: a comparison of what the documentation promises (README, design document, ahu format specification, security and remediation documents, CLI help) against what the binaries actually do. It produced 12 findings: 5 High, 5 Medium, and 2 Low. Nine had isolated executable reproductions; the other three were source-traced. The audit baseline was commit c866700; the remediation merged in 41a534d.

This was the second review of the year. A September 2026 security review had already closed 29 findings (see the September remediation ledger); the October audit checked whether the remaining documented promises matched behavior.

Findings

IDSeverityFindingRemediation
F01Highahu verify reported success without verifying the CMS sealExplicit verify modes: --config PATH (authenticated) or --structure-only; bare invocation fails. The admin verify route reports trust_status, trust_error, and signer_sha256, with overall_ok: false for untrusted input
F02HighMissing seal trust disabled authentication instead of failing admissionFail-closed bundle admission: normal admission requires configured trust; only an explicit storage.allow_unauthenticated_bundles = true (with no other trust configured) permits structure-only demo admission
F03HighThe serving loader accepted orphan deltas and ignored max_chainUnsupported serving profiles (orphan deltas, delta chains, tombstones, compression) are rejected before any durable state change; storage.max_chain is removed, and configurations that set it fail to parse
F04HighLosing the state file silently reset anti-rollback protectionStrict state opening; hoike init-state bootstraps state once (no --force); serve never creates state implicitly; one writer per state directory, enforced with an OS flock held for the process lifetime
F05Highhoike import was an unauthenticated staging copyhoike import --bundle PATH --ca LABEL --config PATH is an offline, authenticated, recoverable installation; --force is removed, and import fails while a server holds the writer lock
F06MediumZstd-marked payloads were served as raw compressed bytesCompressed bundles are rejected at admission (the same gate as F03)
F07MediumSeal/OCSP key separation was optionalProduction file and PKCS#11 signing keys require a complete seal_key + seal_cert pair; ECDSA signers prove separation with a domain-separated signature verified under the seal public key; demo signing generates a distinct ephemeral seal pair
F08MediumA PEM seal_cert failed sealingSeal certificates are normalized (PEM or DER accepted), and the key/certificate pair is proven with a real CMS preflight seal on every load and signing pass
F09MediumThe signing-only gossip rollout dropped other upgraded peersExplicit auth_mode policy (default required), peer_identities named-origin authorization, legacy peer_keys rejected with migration instructions, and a documented four-step fleet rollout
F10Mediumforward_ca was not wired into the TLS clientPer-CA forwarding trust roots are applied; without forward_ca, bundled WebPKI roots are used — never the operating-system trust store; unreadable or malformed roots fail startup and hoike check
F11LowGossip announcements carried the index digestAnnouncements carry the manifest digest, so metadata-only generation changes are distinguishable
F12LowThe draft wire specification differed from produced bundlesThe ahu 0.1 wire profile is frozen, with independently generated golden vectors in testdata/wire-profile-0.1/

Themes

Fail-closed bundle admission (F01, F02, F03, F06). Before the audit, several operator entry points treated a missing trust configuration as permission to skip authentication. Admission now requires configured seal trust everywhere: startup, hot reload, recovery, hoike check, and hoike import share one authenticated admission path, and unsupported serving profiles are rejected before any durable state changes. See Seal Trust Policy.

Durable-state integrity (F04, F05). Anti-rollback protection depended on a state file whose absence was treated as a fresh start. State is now bootstrapped explicitly with hoike init-state, opened strictly, guarded by an exclusive writer lock, and hoike import is an authenticated installation with an atomic commit point. See Anti-Rollback Protection.

Key separation (F07, F08). The seal key and the OCSP signing key must be distinct keys, configured as a complete pair, and proven to work together with a real CMS preflight seal before anything is published. Compromising or rotating one no longer implicitly affects the other.

Authenticated gossip (F09, F11). Gossip authentication is an explicit policy with a documented fleet rollout, and announcements identify a generation by its manifest digest rather than the index digest. See Gossip Configuration.

Trusted forwarding channels (F10). Each forwarding CA gets its own startup-validated outbound TLS client. A configured forward_ca becomes that CA’s only roots; a CA without one validates upstream against the bundled WebPKI roots, never the operating-system trust store.

Spec-truth (F12). The wire specification matches the bundles the tools produce, pinned by independently generated golden vectors. See The ahu Bundle Format.

Posture

All twelve findings are closed with named regression tests. The migration contract is executable and covered by subprocess A/B suites: a strict configuration with a persistent seal pair and existing state succeeds; new empty state fails until init-state; legacy max_chain and --force fail with actionable errors; peer_keys fails with migration instructions. The state-machine suites (state_lock, anti_rollback, installation) run on both Linux and macOS in CI.

The stated posture, verbatim: implemented and locally evidenced; not deployed, not certified. No production deployment, CC/FIPS validation, or independent security review follows from the closure. Live HSM, live 389 DS, real power-loss recovery, and multi-host qualification were not exercised.

October 2026 RustSec remediation

The same month, the dependency tree was remediated against the October 2026 RustSec advisory batch:

  • cargo audit reports zero vulnerabilities at the current lockfile and runs as a CI job on main and on a monthly schedule. One non-fatal warning remains: rustls-pemfile is unmaintained.
  • The unused zstd dependency was removed.
  • The tree was consolidated on p256 0.14 and ecdsa 0.17, with a new internal ecdsa_bridge that keeps the wire encoding byte-identical.
  • TLS-stack updates were semver-compatible.

Evidence